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Turkey has been going through a liberalization process in its electricity market over the last decade. So 
far, the regulatory content of the market reforms has been in the center of attention in the literature, to 
the negligence of regulatory governance. However, recent studies, which applied the theoretical 
insights of new institutional economics to utilities regulation, have demonstrated that political 
endowments of the country draw the boundaries to which extent such regulatory content can be 
effectively implemented. In line with these studies, this paper adopts an institutional approach and 
attempts to identify the political endowments of Turkey in order to further analyze whether the market 
reforms succeeded in bringing about sufficient checks to cure the institutional problems. In other 
words, the paper takes a picture of the overall regulatory arena. The results show that the current 
regulatory structure, especially government-regulator relations, fails to meet good regulatory 
governance criteria. The paper also provides some policy suggestions. 
Keywords 




Energy sector is widely seen as the most promising investment area in Turkish economy. Electricity 
market in particular is one of the fastest growing in the world (Turkish Energy Industry Report, 2009). 
Increasing demand calls for significant investment in the sector, which entails private investment. For 
the last decade, the sector is going through a liberalization process to develop a competitive market 
structure. State-owned electricity generation and distribution assets are being privatized one after 
another.  
In fact, this is not Turkey’s first attempt. The history of introducing private participation in 
electricity sector goes back to the 1980s. Since then, different governments have enacted many laws to 
promote and incentivize both new private investment and the privatization of the existing facilities. 
However, most of these attempts encountered legal challenges and were reversed by the judiciary. 
Several projects were cancelled and deals were broken. Failures of the past have been very costly for 
Turkey. This is, in fact, the reason why the current attempt is less tolerant to faults. 
Certain lessons were learned from the failures; such that the current liberalization process is backed 
up with Electricity Market Law
1 that was enacted in 2001 and Energy Markets Regulatory Authority 
(EMRA) was established as the sector-specific regulator on energy markets. 
However, statistics about developing and transition economies show that introducing a regulator to 
handle market reforms is not sufficient for good regulation. World Bank Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database points out that private investment flows in electricity in these countries (such 
as countries in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, all of which mainly started 
private investment in infrastructure in the 1990s) have faced severe falls in the 2000s. It has been 
argued that the establishment of new regulatory agencies, mostly in the last 15 years, did not prevent 
the Asian IPP crisis, nor the collapse of energy regulatory arrangements in Argentina nor similar 
problems in some other Latin American countries; on the contrary, the weaknesses of such agencies 
are regarded as a contributory factor to these crises (Stern and Cubbin, 2005). 
Then regulatory problems are not automatically solved with the establishment of a new regulatory 
agency. In fact, it gives rise to institutional problems, especially regarding the interrelations of the new 
institution with the existing ones. Economic performance is closely related to the regulatory 
environment and inter-relations among multiple agencies, and the implementation of efficient policies 
is only possible if the institutional structure supports cooperation (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). The 
existence of former institutions may facilitate, hamper or sidetrack the desired evolution and the actual 
consequences of the creation of new institutions (Glachant and Perez, 2009). This is an institutional 
change issue and needs to be handled accordingly. 
From an institutional perspective, however, the current liberalization process does not seem very 
bright. The last decade witnessed a “regulatory chaos”. The transition stage from state-dominated 
structure to a competitive one comprises too many actors, including but not limited to the government, 
EMRA, state-owned generation-distribution-transmission companies, Privatization Administration, 
Turkish Competition Authority and the judiciary, each of whom has a word on regulatory policies. In 
particular, there is an ongoing tension between the government and EMRA on regulatory policies. 
Although EMRA is the competent regulator, the government is inclined to intervene through its de 
jure  authorities on EMRA and de facto power in the regulatory process. In short, the market is 
suffering serious regulatory governance problems. 
This paper takes an institutional approach and tries to make a regulatory governance analysis of the 
sector by looking at the overall regulatory picture. For this purpose, the political and economic 
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endowments of the country are analyzed and their effects on electricity market regulation are 
presented in order to further analyze whether or not the market reforms managed to design the correct 
mechanisms to handle the institutional problems. It is actually surprising that despite the vast number 
of studies on market reforms, not much attention has been paid to make an institutional analysis that 
covers all related institutions in the regulatory process.
2 Turkey appears to be no exception to crucial 
finding of Levy and Spiller (1994) that “regulatory content” has been in the center of analyses, to the 
negligence of “regulatory governance”.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides the theoretical background on 
institutions and regulatory governance in utilities with a short literature review. Chapter Three 
analyzes the political and economic endowments of the country in general, and in electricity in 
particular. It also describes the current institutional arena in electricity regulation. Chapter Four makes 
a brief legal analysis EMRA and then develops a regulatory governance analysis, taking into account 
EMRA-government relations, to see whether EMRA’s regulatory practice fits good regulatory 
governance criteria and what economic implications it has. Chapter Six concludes and provides policy 
suggestions. 
2. Institutions, Regulatory Governance and Economic Performance  
According to North (1992), institutions consist of formal rules and informal constraints (norms of 
behavior, conventions, etc.) as well as their enforcement characteristics. Coase had already pointed out 
that markets will work efficiently only in the absence of transaction costs (Coase, 1960). Building on 
him, North adds that if transaction costs are significant, then institutions matter. They determine the 
cost of transacting and producing, and they reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to 
human interaction. Since neoclassical theory focuses on the operation of efficient markets, Western 
economists usually fail to understand the institutional requirements necessary for the creation of such 
markets; they take the institutions for granted (North, 1992). For developing countries, on the other 
hand, analyzing institutions and institutional change may help for economic development. 
Transaction cost economics (especially O. Williamson) has also contributed to the analysis of 
institutions by pointing attention to the role of asset specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism 
in the emergence of economic institutions. It is particularly applicable to electricity sector, in which 
asset specificity is a key feature and opportunistic asset appropriation is a major problem (see Rufin, 
2003 for details). 
Levy and Spiller (1994) followed North’s institutional approach and applied it to regulatory 
frameworks in order to devise regulatory mechanisms that fit best to a particular country’s 
“institutional endowments”. They became the first ones to make a clear distinction between regulatory 
governance and regulatory incentives, and argued that that the structure of regulatory incentives has 
been the central focus of all theoretical work on regulation, to the neglect of regulatory governance. 
Even though regulatory incentives affect performance, their full effect occurs only if the proper 
regulatory governance structure is in place (Levy and Spiller, 1994). 
In their line of argument, both regulatory governance and regulatory incentives are choice variables 
for policy makers, which are subject to constraints. Choices about regulatory governance are 
constrained by the specific institutional endowment of a nation. In defining “institutional 
endowments” of a nation, Levy and Spiller build on North, and characterize the institutional 
endowment of any country in terms of five key elements: 
•  Country’s legislative and executive institutions; 
•  Country’s judicial institutions; 
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•  Country’s custom and other informal, but broadly accepted norms that constrain the actions of 
individuals and institutions; 
•  The character of contending social interests within the society and the balance between them, 
including the role of ideology; 
•  The country’s (and its institutions’) administrative capabilities. 
In their analysis, Levy and Spiller put most emphasis on the first two elements, namely the country’s 
political and judicial institutions (i.e., the roles of separation of powers, different electoral systems, 
federal vs. unitary states, etc.) In their view, legislative and executive institutions may limit a 
country’s options for regulatory governance. . 
Further studies followed and extended the work of Levy and Spiller. Such studies include Warrick 
(1997), Principles for Good Regulation by UK Better Regulation Task Force (1997), Stern (1997), and 
Stern and Holder (1999).  
The main focus of Stern and Holder (1999) is on informal accountability issues, which correspond 
to third and fourth points from North’s list above
3. In this line of argument, formal regulatory 
arrangements are necessary but not sufficient; informal regulatory accountability matters as well. 
Stern’s emphasis is on the spirit of the law – namely the practical application of the legal framework 
and how it is interpreted. In this context, informal accountability refers to the degree, to which the 
regulatory process encourages debate and open discussion, involves all relevant parties, leads to 
justification by the regulator of decisions and methodologies, and generally leads to a clear 
understanding of the “rules of the game” (Stern, 1997). 
Based on these arguments, Stern and Holder identified six aspects of regulatory frameworks as 
main governance elements. These six aspects were: 
•  Clarity of Roles and Objectives especially between Ministers and regulators to avoid confusion 
as to which functions are carried out by the regulator and which are carried out by the ministry 
(or other bodies), 
•  Autonomy from political intervention will ensure that the regulators are independent. Secure 
sources of funding and protection of senior officers from unfair dismissal by politicians are 
significant issues. 
•  Accountability requires that the decisions of the regulator can be challenged in an effective way. 
Appeal mechanisms and accountability to the legislature can be important in this sense.  
•  Participation of all relevant parties contribute effectively to the regulatory process and increases 
cooperation within the sector as well as support to the regulator, 
•  Transparency  enables market participants to have a better understanding of the regulator’s 
decisions and main reasons behind it. It also contributes to predictability and preciseness as well 
as reducing the likelihood of unfair decisions. 
•  Predictability ensures firms (in a sector with high sunk costs) that “rules of the game” will not 
suddenly change. This also means that requisite changes will be carried out in a consistent 
manner.
4 
These aspects are mostly interrelated and support each other. Similar criteria set forth by various 
authors demonstrate that today there is a consensus among scholars regarding what good governance 
requires. 
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There is also an increasing number of empirical studies with respect to the positive effects of good 
regulatory governance on economic outcome. For telecommunications, Gutierrez (2003) finds, by 
using a regulatory governance index for a sample of 22 Caribbean and Latin American countries, 
statistically significant positive correlations between his index and teledensity and efficiency. For 
electricity, Bergara, Henisz and Spiller (1998) find in their regression analysis for sample of 87 
countries that well-defined and credible political institutions are positively and significantly correlated 
with national electricity generating capacity. Their analysis also shows that judicial independence is 
particularly important in this regard. Cubbin and Stern (2006), in their analysis for 28 developing 
economies over 1998-2001, find that both regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are 
positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity (controlling for 
privatization and competition and allowing for country-specific fixed effects). This positive impact 
also increases for more than 10 years, as experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. 
Moreover, using detailed datasets covering 26 countries and 250 utilities in Caribbean and Latin 
American region, Andres, Guasch and Azumendi (2009) show that regulation matters for sector 
performance on three aspects: (i) The existence of a regulatory agency matters, (ii) The experience of 
the regulatory agency matters, and (iii) Its governance matters as well. 
Recent theoretical studies try to place regulatory governance in public utilities into stronger 
theoretical framework. Spiller and Tommasi (2005) follow New Institutional Economics approach (the 
works of Oliver Williamson in particular) by combining transaction costs economics and positive 
political economy. In a nutshell, they try to explore the implications of looking at regulation as a 
political transaction for the resulting features of regulatory policy and to analyze the institutional 
determinants of regulatory policy. A more concrete approach for the present study was set forth by 
Jordana and Sancho (2004). In their analysis of the regulatory state, they argue that it is the whole 
institutional arena, not just the regulatory agency, which will make the difference in policy processes 
and policy outcomes. In order to explain complex regulatory structures, they develop the concept of 
“institutional constellations”, meaning “…entire sets of formal institutions and interconnected rules 
that shape public decision-making in a given regulatory arena…”(Jordana and Sancho, 2004). The 
following table explains the three dimensions of institutional constellations: 
Institutional Constellations: key dimensions and their variation 
Key dimensions  Definition  Range of variation  Absence  of  inst. 
Constellation 








Allocation of policy 
decisions to different 
institutions 




Power structure  Institutional capacity 






Source: Jordana & Sancho (2004), p. 300 
In short, literature on the analysis of institutions in general, and regulatory governance in particular, 
shows that for effective regulation of public utilities, regulatory governance matters at least as much as 
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3. Political Endowments and the Current Institutional Arena 
This section develops a general framework for political and economic endowments of Turkey. Then it 
draws the current institutional arena in electricity regulation. 
3.1 Political and Economic Endowments of Turkey 
Turkey has a parliamentary system of government for more than 85 years. Separation of powers is 
constitutionally recognized. Politics, however, has traditionally been practiced on slippery and 
unstable grounds. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, there have been 60 governments in 
87 years; namely, the average term of office for a government is less than 1.5 years, which is 
considerably low. U.K.-style “two strong parties” model is not operative in Turkey. Political 
preferences and ideologies tend to support fragmented party structure and usually coalitions in return. 
Political parties usually do not last long and are frequently replaced by new formations. Accordingly, 
governments frequently change hands. It is an exceptional case that the same political party wins the 
elections two times in a row (with few exceptions, one being the current government). Military coups 
in the 1960 - 1980 period, albeit temporary, have also influenced the political composition. After all, 
the country can be characterized by unstable politics.
5 
Together with its political institutions, Turkey’s economic history demonstrates that the country 
has a long tradition of state participation in economy. Even though it never experienced a communist 
system and its economic policies were always based on the free markets mechanism, state has always 
been an important economic actor. This process initially started as a necessity after the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 when the young state chose to adopt statism as its economic policy 
since private sector had neither financial nor technical capabilities to undertake big investments. Over 
time, this mandatory choice became the country’s economic policy due to country’s financial 
conditions while private sector failed to raise enough funds to make major investments. At the 
beginning of 1960s, almost half of the entire economy was held by the state (Özkıvrak and Dileyici, 
2001). State was involved in providing almost every kind of public and private goods. In 1980s, the 
government decided to liberalize the economy including electricity. Privatization of the state-owned 
enterprises has started in this period.
6  
Electricity in particular has always been an important element in this setting. Domination of the 
sector by state-owned enterprises and “political good” nature of electricity enabled politicians to use it 
for political maneuvering.
7 This is due to three general features of utilities, including electricity: (i) 
specific and sunk investments, (ii) economies of scale, and (iii) massive consumption. These features 
incentivize the government to behave opportunistically and expropriate the investing company’s sunk 
assets (Spiller and Tommasi, 2005). Spiller and Martorell (1996) point out that political instabilities 
always trigger government interference with the pricing and investment policies in the sector. Since 
investments in electricity provide benefits only in the future, current governments tend to delay 
investments and find it more profitable to subsidize their constituencies directly through pricing. Thus, 
such a country will have relatively low prices in general and residential prices will be subsidized in 
particular. 
Moreover, governments in Turkey have traditionally tended to use prices to reduce inflationary 
expectations at the expense of larger future deficits, because future deficits will be taken care of by the 
future government whereas current inflation rates may help the current government. For instance, 
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Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, which have been through high inflation rates, have experienced 
similar manipulations by their governments as well. In Brazil and Argentina, real electricity prices 
have fallen sharply during hyperinflation periods and have increased back later on. In other words, 
redistribution and macroeconomic preferences rather than economic efficiency concerns determine the 
prices and policies in politically unstable countries (Spiller and Martorell, 1996). Turkey is no 
exception.  
Nonetheless, only opportunistic behavior on the side of the government is not sufficient to explain 
the overall picture, taking into consideration the privatization attempts in the 1990s. During this 
period, governments put lots of efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises.
8 They passed a number of 
legislation for privatization, most of which failed to meet the legal and economic criteria set by the 
judiciary. Atiyas (2009) argues that these laws were designed to undertake privatizations in quite 
unaccountable and non-transparent ways, and they looked for shortcuts rather than create a solid legal 
base for a proper privatization policy. A plausible explanation might be that politicians and 
bureaucrats lacked the requisite capacity to deal with the complexities of privatization and its 
consequences. Long-term productivity issues and promotion of competition have usually been 
dominated by fiscal considerations (such as generating high revenues, reducing public debt and create 
flexibility in current expenditures).
  
In fact, Turkey suffered substantially from such imperfect and badly-designed privatization 
attempts not only in the sense that development of competition has been delayed, but also in the form 
of monetary damages paid to investors. For instance, in the case of privatization of electricity 
distribution regions, government failed to design proper legal frameworks and take into account 
judiciary’s potential approach (at least in the form of a risk provision in the contracts). In the end, such 
failure turned out to be very costly. Danıştay (Council of State or High Administrative Court) annulled 
the concessions granted to private parties and the government cancelled these privatizations. Private 
parties headed to international arbitration. The last arbitration case was decided in 2010 and, except 
one, Turkey lost all the cases. The total amount that Turkey has to pay to private investors is estimated 
approximately $200 Millions. These high costs will be borne by the society rather than the 
governments in charge back then. Unstable political structure makes it easier for governments to 
externalize the costs of their political actions. 
A more recent example of opportunistic government behavior is related to natural gas prices. Even 
though natural gas prices have increased substantially in the recent years, government kept selling 
electricity (through state-owned companies) at a price that was significantly below the marginal costs.
9 
Even though government tries to explain this policy on social grounds, this was not true since 61.7 % 
of the demand was from industrial customers. Such practice pushed state-owned electricity and gas 
companies, which are also subject to high gas prices, into a debt chain (Sevaioğlu, 2009). Such 
predatory pricing also negatively affected the competitive market structure since it deterred private 
investors from investing.
10 Price mechanism is used by politicians as a means to transfer wealth 
between different social groups. 
Similarly, EMRA’s efforts to introduce cost-based regional pricing scheme in 2003 was hindered 
by the government (Çetin and Oğuz, 2007). Under the government’s scheme, end-use prices are 
uniform across the country whereas costs of supply vary significantly across different regions. This 
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scheme has negative impacts on the private investment and privatization processes since no company 
would like to invest in regions with high costs. Cost-based regional pricing system would solve this 
problem; however, it will result in increased prices in low income regions (Southeastern and Eastern 
Anatolia regions) where level of illegal use is high.
11 Instead of adopting the cost-based regional 
pricing system, the government preferred to implement a transitional mechanism between 2005 and 
2010 in which the prices remained uniform until regional cost differences would be minimized (IEA 
Report, 2005). During this period, illegal use in these regions has remained to be cross-subsidized by 
other consumers (Çetin and Oğuz, 2007).  
The government eventually agreed to adopt cost-based pricing mechanism in 2008. This decision 
inevitably led to drastic prices increases. In 2.5 years, increases in prices amounted up to 72%. In fact, 
the positive climate conditions of 2010 reduced costs of electricity to the government and led to 
expectations that such cost reductions might be reflected to electricity prices (because most of state-
owned generation facilities are hydroelectricity power plants). However, government disappointed the 
market, because Treasury needed financing for rehabilitation of the generation assets to be privatized. 
Bad fiscal conditions of the poorly-managed state-owned enterprises and need for financing forced the 
government to take action and ignore price reduction. 
In short, political concerns have always forced governments to keep control on electricity variables 
whereas efficiency issues are usually overlooked. Current government is no exception. However, 
similar tendencies in other developing countries have already proved failure of this approach. 
Countries like Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, who all had public ownership, tariff discrimination for 
different users and tariffs unrelated to marginal costs, have failed whereas Chilean electric system, 
which was based on competitive markets and marginal cost pricing, turned out to be a huge success 
(Spiller and Martorell, 1996).  
In addition to the government opportunism, social opposition to privatization is at considerable 
level. Such opposition may be explained on traditional statist ideology, which underlies the country’s 
economic history. Sevaioğlu (2009) argues that such statist and anti-liberalist social organizations did 
not exist even in major socialist countries. In an interview, the head of a major energy company counts 
statism as one of the major obstacles to potential investors and states that the idea to maintain 
government authority over all sectors is very strong (See Güney, 2005). North (1992) argues that the 
larger the number of rule changes, the greater the number of losers and opposition. Labor unions 
strictly object to privatizations in order to protect their positions. Their interests are usually aligned 
with the position of extremely nationalistic political parties, who are mainly concerned that foreign 
investment in energy sector may threaten the national security. Nationalistic position is open to 
manipulation by anti-privatization interest groups and political parties (Çetin and Oğuz, 2007). 
From this country-specific institutional analysis, it follows that electricity market restructuring in 
Turkey means upsetting the balances of many parties, which aim at preserving their current positions, 
one of them being the government itself. Governments have traditionally enjoyed the liberty of 
exercising their wide discretion on energy variables for political purposes, to the negligence of 
efficiency concerns. In the presence of such opportunistic incentives, if the government wants to 
attract investment in utilities; it will have to send investors the right signals by designing institutional 
arrangements that will limit its ability to behave opportunistically (Spiller and Tommasi, 2005).  
3.2 The Institutional Arena  
The electricity regulation in Turkey started with the establishment of Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources (MENR) in 1963 as the competent ministry on the country’s energy policy. In 1970, TEK 
(Turkish Electricity Administration) was established as a state monopoly at almost all levels of the 
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sector. Since then, energy sector has witnessed several state-owned enterprises as well as their 
restructurings and unbundlings. After private participation was enabled in generation sector in 1982, 
TEK was restructured as a state-owned enterprise. In 1993, TEK was added into the privatization plan 
and was restructured into TEAŞ (Turkish Electricity Generation & Transmission Co.) and TEDAŞ 
(Turkish Electricity Distribution Co.). 
With the enactment of Electricity Market Law in 2001, TEAŞ was further unbundled into three 
state-owned enterprises: TEİAŞ (transmission as well as balancing and settlement issues between 
private parties), TETAŞ (wholesale activities as well as implementing previous BOO, BOT and TOR 
contracts) and EÜAŞ (operation of the state-owned power plants which are not transferred to private 
sector).  
Under the current structure, MENR is responsible for the preparation and implementation of energy 
policies, plans and programmes in coordination with other public and private entities. Its main tasks 
include determining and implementing national energy policy objectives, ensuring coordination 
between related public bodies and private entities and supervising all exploration, development, 
production and distribution activities for energy and natural resources. 
The Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (EİE), on the other hand, 
is a private law entity and is related to MENR. It was established in 1935 and its authorities have been 
redefined in 2007 to be in line with the new market structure. It mainly carries out studies with relation 
to renewable energy resources and energy efficiency issues, including raising the awareness of the 
society about energy efficiency and providing consulting services. 
State Hydraulic Works (DSİ) is the state water agency responsible for the development of all water 
resources in the country. DSİ implements surface and ground water projects and plans, designs, 
constructs and operates dams and hydroelectric power plants for multi-purpose use. In 2007, DSİ was 
separated from MENR and was related to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. 
The State Planning Organization (DPT) is an advisory body of the Prime Minister. It assists the 
government in determining economic and social policies. For energy sector, it prepares five-year 
development plans in cooperation with the industry and MENR, as well as demand projections. DPT 
issued the Strategy Paper Concerning Electricity Market Reform and Privatization, a roadmap for 
market reforms and privatization, in 2004 (see IEA Report, 2005 for details).
 12  
Speaking of privatization, it is also important to note that privatization is carried out by a special 
authority, Privatization Administration, which is directly related to the Prime Ministry. Its competence 
covers the privatization of all state-owned enterprises, including electricity generation and distribution 
companies. 
And last but not least, with the enactment of Electricity Market Law in 2001, EMRA was placed in 
the core of this regulatory environment as the main regulator with significant authorities. 
In addition to these bodies which directly take part in the regulation of the market, there are others 
which are also involved in formulating regulatory decisions. Judiciary and the Competition Authority 
can be considered in this category. 
3.3 Analysis of the Institutional Structure and Related Problems 
Economic theory envisages that aim of rational economic policy is the design of policy within a 
system of consistent policy goals and instruments. One of the pre-conditions of rational economic 
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policy is knowledge about the interrelation of policy goals. Complementary policy goals both enable 
and support the implementation of separate economic policies whereas conflicting policy goals make 
it harder to implement. The existence of a “wise dictator” is theoretically assumed as a pre-condition 
for the proper implementation of economic policy.
13 
The above-mentioned puzzling institutional landscape appears to be in contradiction with what 
economic theory requires. Appearance of new public institutions on stage, in addition to the existing 
institutional environment, has made regulatory decision making process more complicated. Using the 
terminology of Jordana and Sanch (2004) terminology, in terms of institutional diversity, more-than-
necessary public institutions are involved in policy-making and degree of fragmentation is very high. 
From a public choice perspective, different institutions involved on this stage might have different and 
contradicting interests (and expectations) from the market regulation. Ulusoy (2005) illustrates this in 
electricity distribution privatizations framework.
 In this setting, the EMRA’s main concern may be 
how to expand its authorities on the market at the post-privatization stage, whereas government (and 
Treasury) may be interested in maximizing revenues from privatizations. As Atiyas (2009) points out, 
this is particularly true for the single-party governments of the 2000s since they had strong incentives 
to do so especially after the 2001 financial crisis. At the same time, the Privatization Administration 
may be interested in completing the privatization process as soon as possible for the sake of other 
potential privatizations; and the management and workers of the public enterprises may have 
unemployment concerns. Even the officials of the related ministries may be worried that they will lose 
their “power domain” (Ulusoy, 2005).  
Moreover, the structure lacks a clear allocation of responsibilities. Decision making is distributed 
to several bodies, some of which have overlapping authorities. Limited legal amendments aiming at 
avoiding such overlaps are apparently insufficient. The degree of dispersion remains high. Such a 
structure increases the number and complexity of bureaucratic formalities and paperwork. Increase in 
the number of agencies implies increase in number of licenses, permits and approvals. Therefore 
transacting becomes more costly. And finally, in terms of power structure, the existence of several 
governmental bodies enables the government to have the final say over the decisions in a hierarchical 
structure.  
This can be directly linked to efficiency considerations, namely Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto criteria 
(Oğuz, 2010). Market liberalization is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because taking into account the costs 
and benefits, there are net social gains from liberalization. However, following Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
would create political costs since certain groups will suffer losses. This is particularly relevant in the 
present case since an institutional change as proposed would upset several groups. Instead, politicians 
would prefer to follow the Pareto criterion, because it requires unanimous consent of all voters/groups 
and implies less political costs (Oğuz, 2010). The drawback is that high number of veto players slow 
down the liberalization process and institutional change becomes impossible. Potential social gains are 
sacrificed in return for saving political costs. 
A closer look at the regulatory governance level of EMRA would be helpful for a better 
understanding of the current regulatory practice. Further regulatory governance a 
4. Legal and Economic Analysis of EMRA 
This chapter will make a legal analysis of EMRA and develop a regulatory governance analysis in 
order to assess whether the EMRA’s current regulatory practice fits good regulatory governance 
criteria as well as its economic implications. 
                                                      
13  This paragraph benefits from the LL.M. Course “Advanced Topics of Competition and Economic Regulation” lectured 
by Prof. Klaus Heine in Erasmus University Rotterdam. S. Mustafa Durakoğlu 
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A. Brief Legal Analysis of EMRA 
Legal Status: The main purpose of Electricity Market Law is to ensure the development of a 
financially viable, stable and transparent electricity market operating in a competitive environment and 
to ensure the autonomous regulation and supervision of this market. For this purpose, EMRA was 
established as the regulatory authority. EMRA lies within the sphere of executive branch and is 
“affiliated” with the MENR.
14 However, it has legal personality as well as financial and administrative 
autonomy. EMRA is governed and represented by Energy Markets Regulatory Board (the “Board”). 
Main Structural Characteristics: The Board is composed of nine members. All Board members are 
appointed by the Council of Ministers. When making the appointment, Council of Ministers also 
selects the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. The term of office is six years and the members can be 
re-elected. Board members can only be dismissed on grounds of incapacity and misbehavior.  
An important aspect of EMRA Board decisions is that they cannot be overruled by any 
governmental body; they are only subject to judicial review by Danıştay. Such filings against Board 
decisions qualify as “urgent matters” and have priority.  
EMRA’s budget is supervised by Supreme Audit Board, which is a governmental body affiliated 
with the Prime Ministry. The Board also submits an informative annual report to MENR. 
Authorities: The Board’s authorities in the electricity sector mainly include issuance of licenses, 
preparation and enforcement of secondary legislation, regulation of distribution, transmission and 
retail sale tariffs as well as the wholesale tariffs of TETAŞ, taking appropriate measures for the 
promotion of competition in the sector and application of sanctions, including administrative fines and 
cancellation of licenses. Moreover, the Board has some special authorities with respect to resolution of 
disputes in certain cases and expropriation of lands on behalf of private investors, when necessary.  
Income and Personnel Policy: EMRA’s income with respect to the electricity sector mainly 
consists of license fees, 25% of the administrative fines sanctioned by the Board and a surcharge on 
transmission tariffs (maximum amount of 1%). 
Council of Ministers is authorized to decide on EMRA’s internal organization, including the duties 
and authorities of the departments and the number of personnel as well as the salaries to be paid to the 
Board members. The salaries and other financial rights of the personnel shall be decided by the Board 
within the limits to be set forth by the Council of Ministers. 
B. Regulatory Governance Analysis of EMRA 
Based on the regulatory governance criteria set forth by Stern and Holder (1999), this section develops 
a regulatory governance analysis of the current regulatory practice of EMRA, taking into account both 
formal and informal aspects of regulation, and its economic outcomes on the sector.  
Clarity of Roles and Objectives has not been sufficiently provided after the market reforms. OECD 
Report on Turkey’s energy sector specifically points out that the role of the involved parties (i.e. the 
government, regulator and state companies) should be determined clearly (IEA Report, 2005). This is, 
indeed, related to two other problems: (i) institutional diversity, and (ii) allocation of responsibilities 
among these institutions. Atiyas and Dutz (2005) count at least 8 entities with separate management 
teams involved in the regulation process and underline the lack of coordination among them. Due to 
highly dispersed regulatory structure, allocation of responsibilities is costly and overlapping 
authorities are inevitable. Also, it is not enough to define only the duties of the ministry and the 
                                                      
14  Pursuant to Articles 123 and 127 of the Turkish Constitution, “unity of administration” principle applies. Thus, especially 
in cases of independent regulatory agencies, it is a common practice to “affiliate” the agency with a ministry to satisfy 
this principle. Political Endowments and Electricity Market Regulation in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis 
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regulator since government have additional tools to influence the sector. Relevant laws have been 
amended to redefine each institution’s role, but they are not very effective. An interesting example is 
that Electricity Market Law limited the authorities of the General Directorate of Energy Affairs to the 
extent that these authorities are not left to other public bodies (such as EMRA). Apparently, the 
legislature anticipated the possibility of overlapping authorities; however, instead of clearly defining 
them, they are left vaguely and open to interpretation and political maneuvering.  
In fact, authorities of many institutions could have been transferred to EMRA subsequent to its 
establishment. The establishment of EMRA represents an institutional change and needs to be treated 
accordingly. Once a regulator is in place, its scope of authority covers mostly those of the many 
institutions of the former structure; thus, such institutions are no longer needed. For instance, EİE 
carries out studies on energy efficiency and renewable energy issues. DPT advises the government on 
economic policies and prepares five-year development plans in cooperation with EMRA.
15 Instead, the 
structure proposed here is that sector-specific regulator is better suited for effective regulation and 
decision making as well as advising the government when necessary at a lower cost. From an 
efficiency perspective, the first thing to do is to reduce the number of institutions to an efficient level 
and only then responsibilities can be allocated accordingly and clearly. Such a system could decrease 
decision making costs and information costs, especially by avoiding duplication of costs. From the 
investors’ perspective, it could strengthen EMRA’s authority over the market and enable providing 
reliable regulatory commitment. Clear allocation of responsibilities would also contribute to 
accountability and predictability concerns. 
It is, however, difficult to dissolve long-established institutions within the state. It is not hard to 
imagine that abolishing these institutions will face strong reactions, especially from their staff that will 
face the threat of unemployment. An intermediate solution could be integration of suitable institutions 
into EMRA. EMRA may benefit from such integration in terms of synergy gains as well as their broad 
experience in the sector.  
Autonomy from political intervention is probably the most significant aspect in Turkish case as it 
has already been mentioned that politicians have an inveterate tradition of using electricity for political 
purposes. Therefore, it is a correct choice to establish an independent regulator with “financial and 
administrative” autonomy rather than carry out regulation under the hierarchical structure of the 
ministry. However, in order to evaluate the degree of autonomy of EMRA, one needs to put positive 
and negative aspects on the scale. 
On the positive side, one could mention the following: EMRA has its own budget and enjoys 
financial independence. EMRA Board decisions cannot be overturned by the government; these 
decisions are only subject to judicial review. Also, Board members cannot be removed from office by 
the government except incapacity or misbehavior.  
However, what lies on the negative side of the scale reduce the impacts of the positive ones. Firstly, 
all EMRA Board members are appointed by the Council of Ministers.
16 In fact, the Constitutional 
Court held in a similar case that number of Board members to be appointed by the Council of 
Ministers may damage the autonomous structure of an authority.
17 In line with this decision, current 
practice may be annulled by the Constitutional Court on similar grounds. 
It is also important to emphasize a time-periodic overlap: EMRA was established in 2001 and the 
same political party is in charge since 2002. This means that EMRA’s regulatory process up until now 
                                                      
15  It was DPT who issued the vital Strategy Paper Concerning Electricity Market Reform and Privatization. 
16  Aslan (2007) notes that the Board had been designed in a more independent way in the first place, namely the members 
to be nominated by several entities; however, this structure has not been implemented.  
17  Constitutional Court decision E.2002/100, K. 2004/109, dated 21 September 2004. S. Mustafa Durakoğlu 
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has almost entirely been overseen by the same political party.
18 Therefore, political preferences and 
attitude towards electricity market liberalization and privatization have been continuous and consistent 
during this period. Current composition of EMRA Board is a direct reflection of this problem. The 
entire Board, including the President, has been appointed by this government. This does not 
necessarily imply that such appointments have been made due to political party affiliations. Policy 
preferences might have carried some weight as well. However, what necessarily follows from such 
composition that “agent losses” will most probably be very limited. In principal – agent terminology, 
the problem of agency losses arise when the agent (regulator) acts contrary to the preferences of the 
principal (government). Such losses can arise from two sources: either “shirking”, because the agent 
follows its own preferences, which diverge from those of the principal’s, or “slippage”, because of 
incentives for the agent to act contrary to the preferences of the principal (Thatcher, 2005). Under the 
current appointment framework, agent losses will be low, because there is a high possibility that the 
Board members will have similar preferences with the government. This is to say that “shirking” will 
be low. In addition, the institutional design incentivizes the Board members to follow the preferences 
of the government, especially for reappointment concerns (Thatcher, 2005). Namely, “slippage” will 
be low as well. In either case, current framework minimizes agency losses. 
Secondly, even though most of independent regulatory agencies in Turkey are audited by the Court 
of Accounts, EMRA’s budget is supervised by Supreme Audit Board. Court of Accounts audits on 
behalf of the legislature whereas Supreme Audit Board is a governmental body affiliated with the 
Prime Ministry. This mechanism provides the government with a political tool to interfere EMRA’s 
internal affairs and weakens EMRA’s position against the government. The same Constitutional Court 
decision (mentioned above) also rules that Supreme Audit Board does not have jurisdiction over this 
type of agencies. Thus, this practice may be annulled as unconstitutional. 
As the third point, Aslan (2007) points out that EMRA is defined as “financial and administrative 
autonomy” rather than simply “independent”. He emphasizes that considering EMRA is related to 
MENR, it is legally possible that it may take orders from MENR within the administrative hierarchy 
(Aslan, 2007).  
Empirical evidence also provides interesting results. Şanlısoy and Özcan (2006) apply an 
independence index to regulatory agencies in Turkey and find that EMRA ranks last among its peers.
19  
In short, in addition to the power that the government holds through various institutions in 
regulatory process, the current framework gives government direct control over EMRA itself. It 
enables the government to play this game in a traditional principal – agent framework and trivializes 
“autonomy” feature of the regulator.  
Accountability of EMRA can only be controlled by judicial review in Turkey since neither the 
government nor the legislature is entitled to review any challenges against EMRA Board decisions. 
Danıştay is the competent court to review filings against EMRA. This is a positive feature, because 
Danıştay has more expertise in the sector than a court of first instance and can handle cases at a lower 
cost. This system also enables unification of judgments and increases the level of legal certainty 
(Aslan, 2007). Moreover, Danıştay reviews these filings as an urgent matter, which avoids loss of 
time.  
Participation of relevant parties (regulated firms, consumers and other sector participants) in the 
regulatory process may help to improve cooperation within the sector, and it may legitimize EMRA’s 
                                                      
18  The Justice and Development Party (AKP) had two single-party governments since 2002, one being the current 
government. They have a strong majority in the parliament. 
19  An interesting point is that when in their cross-country analysis, EMRA’s independence index ranks higher than 
electricity regulatory agencies of many developed countries including England, France, Holland and Norway. For similar 
results, see Ergün (2007). These results can be interpreted on the grounds that informal institutional structures matter 
more than formal ones in Turkey and carry more weight in practice. Political Endowments and Electricity Market Regulation in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis 
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decisions in sector participants’ eyes. It is a positive point that EMRA is obliged to (and in practice 
does) consult market participants while preparing regulations. However, the actual effects of 
participation in this system are ambiguous, because it is unknown whether EMRA actually takes into 
account any suggestions from these consultations. A more effective solution would be that EMRA’s 
consultation responses can be made publicly available. This system would set the right incentives on 
both sides: It would incentivize the market participants to express their opinions on proposed 
regulations since they have a higher chance of making an influence on the regulator. EMRA would 
also benefit from this active participation since this system would allow EMRA to learn the 
preferences of particular interest groups and foresee potential political problems that may arise in 
advance (Spiller and Tommasi, 2005). Then, this setting also minimizes the costs incurred by the 
legislature to supervise EMRA since the legislature does not need to be actively involved in the 
regulatory process as it used to be (Spiller and Tommasi, 2005).  
A more concrete suggestion to improve participation would be establishment of a private sector 
consultation committee. This committee would be composed of representatives of sector participants 
and have an advisory role for EMRA (OECD, 2002). It would close the gap between EMRA and the 
private sector and serve as an ex ante consultation and information exchange forum. It could 
effectively contribute to reducing the information asymmetries between the parties. 
Transparency helps market participants to have a better understanding of EMRA’s approach to 
certain issues as well as its decisions and the underlying rationale. EMRA is not legally obliged to 
publish its decisions, which is a significant obstacle to transparency. In practice, EMRA voluntarily 
publishes some of its major decisions, and informs market participants on certain issues whenever it 
deems necessary. However, these decisions are usually brief and do not provide comprehensive 
information regarding on which legal and economic grounds they were based. Similarly, the electricity 
market legislation is constantly subject to change and there is no sufficient precedent to rely upon 
concerning how EMRA interprets and applies the legislation. This increases the costs of transacting 
between market participants, because information is costly and in this case, held asymmetrically by the 
parties (North, 1992). In order to avoid this, EMRA should publish all its decisions, including the legal 
and economic reasoning behind them, and comprehensive memoranda on the interpretation and 
implementation of the controversial provisions in relevant legislation.
20 Such practice would 
significantly reduce uncertainties for market participants along with transaction and information 
costs.
21 Providing transparency could also address regulatory failures, such as regulatory capture and 
bias towards certain parties (OECD, 2002). 
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that electricity market licenses and EMRA’s annual reports are 
publicly available. Other reports, which EMRA is legally obliged to prepare such as Electricity 
Security of Supply Report and Electricity Market Development Report, must be made accessible for 
market participants within a reasonable time as well. 
Predictability  is of utmost importance in a country of unstable politics. Electric companies 
undertake investments, which need to be recouped over several years, and they need to be assured by 
reliable commitments that they will not face sudden, unpredictable changes. Uncertainty is costly. 
EMRA is better positioned to deal with this since it has been clear that governments fail to provide 
such commitment for political reasons. However, a recent report by the State Audit Board (2010) finds 
that EMRA Board decisions tend to differ in similar circumstances and lack consistency. To cure this 
problem, EMRA can start by publishing an annual regulatory plan, which gives an approximate list of 
issues to be dealt with and a timetable (OECD, 2002). This may reduce the likelihood of regulatory 
                                                      
20  See the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets’ website for a good example of transparent regulatory practice: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk  
21  It is very common among energy lawyers in Turkey to constantly call EMRA officials to learn how they interpret or 
implement certain provisions, which in return increases information costs. S. Mustafa Durakoğlu 
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surprises, thereby minimizing the negative consequences of asymmetric information and the costs 
arising from uncertainty. Also transparency in regulatory process, as mentioned, supports 
predictability in the sense that market participants will be able to observe EMRA’s approach to certain 
issues and take it into consideration in advance. 
C. Comments on the Results 
This overall regulatory governance analysis does not provide very optimistic results. The analysis 
shows that market reforms failed to bring about a comprehensive and consistent institutional change, 
especially with respect to the position of the regulator. Good “regulatory content” may have been 
introduced; however, “regulatory governance” problem is still at the heart of the regulatory process 
and has negative effects on the implementation of this regulatory content.  
It should be kept in mind, however, that EMRA started from scratch and currently has less than a 
decade of regulatory practice. Albeit young, it has contributed significantly to the development of a 
competitive market structure and its efforts must be appreciated. Nonetheless, so far, it has been 
overshadowed by the government under the current structure. Even though the analysis reveals that 
this is mainly due to government behavior, EMRA can still improve its own regulatory methods as 
well. Especially there is room for improvement in transparency and predictability issues. In fact, 
EMRA is currently involved in a permanent institutional development and strategic management 
project, which signals that EMRA is aware of where it stands. 
The critical negative aspect of the current structure is that the political endowments of the country 
have not been sufficiently taken into account, and no institutional checks have been devised to avoid 
opportunistic government behavior. The destiny of the sector is still up to the government rather than 
the regulator. The government seems to be reluctant to fasten the liberalization process, and prefers to 
obtain more political gains in the meantime. As in the case of electricity prices, failures of the past and 
bad fiscal conditions of the state-owned enterprises are also burdens on efficient policy-making. 
As a principle, incentives and subsidies to investors only function to the extent that they are 
credible (Bergara, Henisz and Spiller, 1998). The very nature of the relationship between private 
investors and the government involves a simple imbalance that investors are under no obligation to 
invest in a particular country and can always seek better opportunities whereas the government needs 
such investment, especially from foreign investors (O’Rourke and Tomiak, 2005). In the absence of 
substantive constraints on arbitrary government action, it is not possible to attract foreign investment 
and exploit efficiency gains from competitive markets.  
Lack of credibility deters foreign investment and delays the liberalization process. The most recent 
example concerns the applicants for windfarm licenses. EMRA received a record number of 
applications for windfarm projects in 2007 and collected performance bonds in the amount of TL 550 
Million (approximately € 290 Million) from the applicants. However, it took EMRA and TEİAŞ 2.5 
years just to conclude the necessary technical studies. During this long period, applicant firms suffered 
high opportunity costs as well as real costs, such as the costs of holding a performance bond from a 
bank. Many firms applied for withdrawal of their applications and filed lawsuits. It seems that there 
will be another rush of lawsuits and legal challenges in the near future, which will result in more costs. 
Çetin and Oğuz (2007) also note that many companies applied for to get government subsidies; 
however, they did not start construction since they could not count on government’s credibility and 
commitment. Similarly, the privatization of electricity distribution regions, which were scheduled to 
be completed in 2006, went more slowly than anticipated and the deadline had to be extended to the 
end of 2010, because investors were not happy with the government’s pricing policies and were 
reluctant to bid for the tenders.  Political Endowments and Electricity Market Regulation in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis 
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Political uncertainty also played its part, as usual, in this setting: The Constitutional Court case 
concerning the possible closure of the Justice and Development Party (the current government) 
deterred foreign investment and had negative implications through the entire economy.  
The problems of opportunism and lack of commitment do not only concern the current 
government. Past governments did the same and so will do the future governments to maximize their 
political gains. Thus, Turkey needs to reform its political and regulatory institutions so as to provide 
reliable commitment to the private sector. Since political institutional change will most probably take 
a long time, what needs to be done in the short run is to adapt the regulatory institutions to the political 
realities of the country. Policies should be formulated and backed up by the government and EMRA 
hand-in-hand. Day-to-day regulation of the market must be left solely to the regulator since it is better 
suited to provide regulatory commitment. Private participation and competitive market structure will 
never reach desirable levels unless opportunistic government behavior and regulatory commitment 
issues are solved.  
5. Conclusion 
New institutional economics offers a more comprehensive understanding of regulation and regulatory 
environments with significant contributions from law and politics. Especially in a developing country 
context, institutions and institutional change is of vital importance for better economic performance in 
Turkey.  
In a country of unstable politics, high possibility of variation in the political structure has provided 
room for opportunistic government behavior in the past. Especially, as in most developing countries, 
governments have enjoyed the liberty of using electricity for political purposes. Economic efficiency 
concerns have usually been overlooked for the sake of macroeconomic and redistribution concerns. 
Poorly-designed privatization attempts failed to meet the high legal and economic standards set by the 
judiciary, and eventually resulted in very high costs. Moreover, at social level, statist beliefs in 
economic life are deep-rooted. 
The Electricity Market Law of 2001 failed to bring about a comprehensive institutional change to 
this structure. Sufficient institutional checks have not been designed to curb opportunistic government 
behavior, and EMRA is left in a position to be politically influenceable. Moreover, old and new public 
institutions involved in regulatory process with overlapping authorities and conflicting interests have 
turned the regulatory arena into a “regulatory/institutional chaos”. The current structure is highly 
bureaucratic and high number of players with de facto/de jure veto powers poses high transaction 
costs as well as political and economic risks for investors. EMRA’s efforts despite the drawbacks of 
this structure are gratefully appreciated; however, criteria for good regulation are still not met.  
What may then be the policy implications? Here comes what North (1992) calls the “dilemma of 
institutional change”. Rapid change will result in social and political turmoil since informal constraints 
and underlying ideological perceptions will not simply change all at once. Slow change, on the other 
hand, will be sabotaged by the existing bureaucracy and interest groups so that the reforms will be 
distorted, dissipated and dissolved (North, 1992). Then there exists no clear cut policy that can guide 
the policy-maker in restructuring and institutional change efforts. Nevertheless, some policy 
suggestions can still be put forward to improve the current regulatory structure. Main policy 
implications may be summarized as follows: 
1.  Both the government and EMRA should be aware, as a general regulatory principle, that good 
regulatory content can be effective only when it is supported by good regulatory governance, 
and they should take this basic fact into consideration at every step of policy-making. 
2.  Fragmented institutional structure should be fixed. Public institutions which have lived out 
their lives need to be abolished. Overlaps in authorities should be prevented and responsibilities S. Mustafa Durakoğlu 
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should be allocated clearly. Cooperation should be promoted. A “transaction cost reducing” 
approach should be adopted in general. 
3.  Institutional checks should be devised to limit opportunistic government behavior in the 
market. EMRA should be taken out of the direct political influence of the government, and the 
government’s inherent power in the market should be superseded by EMRA, which is better 
suited to provide reliable commitment to investors.  
4.  EMRA needs to improve the way it regulates the market. There is room for progress especially 
with respect to transparency, participation and predictability issues. Particular attention should 
be paid to public briefings regarding the significance of competitive markets and private 
investment in order to overcome statist beliefs at the social level.  
Last but not least, policy makers should keep in mind that there is no single template for effective 
utility regulation. The solutions to regulatory problems in a developing country like Turkey may differ 
from those of a highly developed country. Therefore regulatory design must always take into account 
the institutional endowments (constitutional, legal, political, judicial, etc.) and administrative 
capabilities of the country. Public policies that are intentionally or recklessly contrary to this 
fundamental motto are doomed to failure. Political Endowments and Electricity Market Regulation in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis 
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